• Epistemic paternalism : a defence
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-電子資源 : 單行本
    副題名: a defence
    作者: Ahlstr{EFBFBD}omKristoffer, 1980-
    其他團體作者: Palgrave Connect (Online service)
    出版地: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ;
    出版者: Palgrave Macmillan;
    出版年: 2013
    面頁冊數: 1 online resource (xi, 194 pages)
    標題: Epistemics. -
    電子資源: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137313171
    附註: Description based on print version record
    摘要註: We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without her consent but for her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more.
    ISBN: 9781137313171electronic bk.
    ISBN: 113731317Xelectronic bk.
    內容註: 1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended.
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