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Veto power : institutional design in the European Union

[NT 42944] Record Type:	[NT 8598] Electronic resources : [NT 40817] monographic
[NT 47348] Title Information:	institutional design in the European Union
[NT 47261] Author:	SlapinJonathan B., 1979-
[NT 47356] Secondary Intellectual Responsibility:	Project Muse
[NT 47351] Place of Publication:	Ann Arbor, Mich.
[NT 47263] Published:	University of Michigan Press;
[NT 47352] Year of Publication:	2011
[NT 47264] Description:	1 online resource (xii, 184 p.)ill. :
[NT 47298] Series:	New comparative politics
[NT 47266] Subject:	Legislative veto - European Union countries -
[NT 51458] Online resource:	http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780472027750/
[NT 47265] Notes:	Issued as part of UPCC book collections on Project MUSE
[NT 51398] Summary:	Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving anorganization is extremelyunlikely. For example, small European stateshave periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto---or veto threat---has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration
[NT 50961] ISBN:	9780472027750electronic bk.
[NT 50961] ISBN:	0472027751electronic bk.
[NT 50961] ISBN:	9780472117932hbk.
[NT 50961] ISBN:	0472117939hbk.
[NT 60779] Content Note:	Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power

Veto power : institutional design in the European Union
Slapin, Jonathan B.

Veto power : institutional design in the European Union / Jonathan B. Slapin - Ann Arbor, Mich. : University of Michigan Press, 2011. - 1 online resource (xii, 184 p.) ; ill.. - (New comparative politics).
Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power.
Issued as part of UPCC book collections on Project MUSEIncludes bibliographical references (p. 167-178) and index.
ISBN 9780472027750ISBN 0472027751ISBN 9780472117932ISBN 0472117939
Legislative veto -- European Union countries

Veto power : institutional design in the European Union
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