嶺東科技大學 |

[NT 42591] Language: 簡体中文

[NT 5635] Back

[NT 59884] Switch To: [NT 5556] Labeled | [NT 5559] MARC Mode | [NT 33762] ISBD

Structured to fail? : regulatory performance under competing mandates

[NT 42944] Record Type:	[NT 1579] Language materials, printed : [NT 40817] monographic
[NT 47348] Title Information:	regulatory performance under competing mandates
[NT 47261] Author:	CarriganChristopher,
[NT 47351] Place of Publication:	Cambridge, United Kingdom
[NT 47263] Published:	Cambridge University Press;
[NT 47352] Year of Publication:	2017
[NT 47264] Description:	xv, 320 p.ill. : 24 cm.;
[NT 47266] Subject:	Administrative agencies - Evaluation - United States -
[NT 47266] Subject:	Administrative procedure - Political aspects - United States -
[NT 47266] Subject:	BP Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010. -
[NT 47266] Subject:	Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, Japan, 2011. -
[NT 47266] Subject:	Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. -
[NT 51398] Summary:	"In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in-depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases"--Provided by publisher
[NT 50961] ISBN:	978-1-107-18169-4bound
[NT 50961] ISBN:	1-107-18169-0bound
[NT 60779] Content Note:	1. Linking regulatory failures to organizational design Part I. Examining the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators 2. Isolated effects or widespread dysfunction 3. Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain performance Part II. Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the Gulf Oil Disaster 4. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS 5. Politics and offshore oil and gas policy Part III. A Theory of Multiple-Purpose Regulators 6. Policy context and the political choice to combine purposes 7. Operations, organization, politics, and policy context

Structured to fail? : regulatory performance under competing mandates
Carrigan, Christopher

Structured to fail? : regulatory performance under competing mandates / Christopher Carrigan - Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2017. - xv, 320 p. ; ill. ; 24 cm..
1. Linking regulatory failures to organizational design.
Includes bibliographical references (p.288-307) and index..
ISBN 978-1-107-18169-4ISBN 1-107-18169-0
Administrative agenciesAdministrative procedureBP Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010.Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, Japan, 2011.Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. -- Evaluation -- Political aspects -- United States -- United States

Structured to fail? : regulatory performance under competing mandates
LDR:03439nam a2200193 450 001 326975
010 1 $a 978-1-107-18169-4 $b bound $d NT$2572
010 1 $a 1-107-18169-0 $b bound $d NT$2572
100 $a 20180420d2017 k y0engy01 b
102 $a gb
105 $a a a 001yy
200 1 $a Structured to fail? $e regulatory performance under competing mandates $f Christopher Carrigan
210 $a Cambridge, United Kingdom $d 2017 $c Cambridge University Press
215 1 $a xv, 320 p. $d 24 cm. $c ill.
320 $a Includes bibliographical references (p.288-307) and index.
327 1 $a 1. Linking regulatory failures to organizational design $a Part I. $a Examining the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators $a 2. Isolated effects or widespread dysfunction $a 3. Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain performance $a Part II. $a Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the Gulf Oil Disaster $a 4. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS $a 5. Politics and offshore oil and gas policy $a Part III. $a A Theory of Multiple-Purpose Regulators $a 6. Policy context and the political choice to combine purposes $a 7. Operations, organization, politics, and policy context
330 $a "In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in-depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases"--Provided by publisher
330 $a "Regulatory Performance under Competing Mandates In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in- depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases"--Provided by publisher
606 # $a Administrative agencies $x Evaluation $x Case studies $y United States $2 lc $3 394604
606 # $a Administrative procedure $x Political aspects $y United States $2 lc $3 394605
606 # $a BP Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010. $2 lc $3 394606
606 # $a Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, Japan, 2011. $3 309131
606 # $a Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. $3 226043
676 $a 352.290973
700 1 $a Carrigan $b Christopher $3 398058
801 0 $a tw $b 嶺東科技大學圖書館